One explanation provided for the relatively high and increasingly stable spreads for moderatesized IPOs ($20-$80 million) documented in Chen and Ritter (2000) is that issuing firms focus less on price and more on a combination of investment bank-differentiating factors (such as underwriter prestige, analyst coverage, industry expertise, under-pricing, price stabilization activities, liquidity provision, and so on,) and banks use industry-based differentiation as a source of market power. Using a new approach developed in a model of firm location choice due to Ellison and Glaeser (1997), this paper presents some evidence on the combined relevance of such bank-differentiating factors, over and above bank size, for firms choosing investment banks for floating IPOs. For moderate-sized IPOs, there is a little, but not much evidence that such factors are a good explanation for high and increasingly stable spreads. Other than in a few of the largest industries, bank-differentiating factors are not significantly relevant for a large proportion of industries. Moreover, one aggregate measure of differentiation is declining over time.
Introduction
As shown in the well-known paper by Chen and Ritter (2000) , in the market for initial public offerings (IPOs), the moderate-sized IPO market (IPOs in the range $20-$80 million) has high and increasingly stable prices -with gross spreads of about 7 percent of IPO proceeds.
1 This is in contrast to differential and significantly lower pricing observed both in IPO markets in other countries and in markets for seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), whether in the U.S. or abroad.
One of the several explanations postulated for this "seven percent puzzle" is that issuing firms may focus less on price and more on some combination of investment bankdifferentiating factors, (such as underwriter prestige, analyst coverage, industry expertise, under-pricing, price stabilization activities, liquidity provision, and so on,) and investment banks use industry-based differentiation as a source of market power.
Earlier work has presented some evidence regarding this explanation. For example, Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001) 2 find that in the decision of firms to switch from their IPO-underwriter to a different SEO-underwriter, IPO-underwriting fees charged are 1 As they show, during the period 1995-1998, about 91 percent of firms floating IPOs between 20 and 80 million dollars paid a gross spread of exactly 7 percent to raise this capital. Moreover, the use of this 7 percent spread has increased over time; from 26 percent of all moderate-sized IPOs in 1985-87, to 75 percent in 1988-94, to 91 percent in 1995-98, and more recently, to 96 percent in 1999-03. 2 They look at 572 firms with initial public offerings during 1993-95 that returned for a seasoned equity offering in the next three years, and 180 of which switched underwriters, and on surveys of decisionmakers (CFOs and CEOs) of 62 of these switching firms. Their focus is slightly different, in that they consider reasons for firms to switch underwriters for a SEO. Of course, an important distinction between the IPO and SEO decision is that the SEO firm has a history of securities market evaluation of its prospects, and therefore, the uncertainty regarding its prospects is different from that of an IPO firm. Consequently, firm decisions in each case are potentially different. Moreover, the data here cover a different time period, 1985-2003 , the analysis focuses on moderate-sized IPOs, and the analysis does not use surveys.
accorded low relevance, whereas graduating to an underwriter with higher prestige and with better analyst coverage are accorded high relevance. Moreover, Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm, and Yu (2003) show that IPO terms and the decision of IPO-issuing firms to carry through with an offering are conditioned on the experience of their primary market contemporaries. Furthermore, Logue, Rogalski, Seward, and Foster-Johnson (2002) find that underwriter reputation is a significant determinant of pre-market underwriter activities, is weakly related to after-market price stabilization activities, and is unrelated to issuer returns. Additional evidence for the role of underwriter reputation and industry-specific spillovers is provided in, among others, Beatty and Ritter (1986) , Carter and Manaster (1990) , Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) , Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) , Dunbar (2000) , Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm (2002) , and Lowry and Schwert (2002) .
Using a new approach developed in a relatively recent model of firm location choice due to Ellison and Glaeser (1997) , 3 this paper conducts a new test of the extent to which this explanation holds in the data. 4 Intuitively, the test proposed by Ellison and Glaeser (henceforth, EG) can be motivated by a simple example, as follows. Suppose there are two investment banks (indexed 1 and 3 Their model is applied here as a discrete-choice model of a firm's optimal choice of an investment bank. Notably, the model focuses on firm decision-making, and does not model investment bank decision-making explicitly. Details are provided below. 4 In particular, this paper does not investigate the question of implicit or explicit collusion. For references to that strain of the literature, confer Chen and Ritter (2000) , which uses arguments from Chen (1998), Dutta and Madhavan (1997) , Rotember and Saloner (1986) , and from Bhagat and Frost (1986) , Booth and Smith (1986) , and other papers, including Ljunqvist and Wilhelm, Jr. (1999) , Hansen (2001) , Christie and Schulz (1994) , Christie, Harris, and Schulz (1994) . A recent survey of under-pricing, share allocation, and overall IPO activity is presented in Ritter and Welch (2002) . Using EG's discrete-choice model, differential clustering of firms with banks is generated by two parameters that are viewed in terms of two broad categories of bankdifferentiating factors -industry-specific information spillovers and bank-specific reputation factors, such as underwriter prestige. 5 For each industry, the stronger is the 5 Intuitively, the parameter for industry-specific factors is a reduced form index of relevance of factors related to industry-specific information spillovers, such as better investment bank placements of IPO shares (whether through book-building, under-pricing, or share allocation) depending on number of industry deals done, more expert analyst coverage depending on number of industry deals done, economies of scope in information production costs (including lower marketing costs and better post-IPO stock liquidity) depending on number of industry deals done, and so on. Similarly, the parameter for bank-specific factors is a reduced form index of relevance of factors related to underwriter prestige. That is, firms in a particular industry might choose an investment bank partly because of its reputation, indicating better bank placement relevance of these parameters, the greater is clustering of this industry's firms with particular banks.
Notice that some clustering of firms with banks can occur randomly as well, and therefore, EG's test of differential clustering takes as a benchmark the outcome that would occur if firms choose banks randomly. This benchmark assumes that in the absence of relevance of bank-differentiating factors, the expected probability that a firm chooses a particular bank is the bank's market share. (Intuitively, in the absence of relevance of bank-differentiating factors, firms choose banks as if by throwing darts randomly at a map of all banks, with size of a bank given by its market share. 6 ) EG's results provide industry-level tests for when observed clustering is different from benchmark, and this test is used here to determine existence of relevance of bankdifferentiating factors for each industry.
Based on observed clustering, EG's results derive a measure of the strength of a comb ination of these two parameters. This measure is termed a differentiation index. It takes a value between 0 and 1, (with higher parameter values implying greater index value,) it is comparable across industries, across segments of the IPO market, and across time.
of IPO shares depending on underwriter reputation, an overall reputation for better analysts or greater analyst coverage, a reputation for price stabilization activities or for liquidity, and so on. 6 A caveat to this benchmark is that bank size might be positively related to underwriter prestige. (This is not always the case. For example, Chen and Ritter (2000) document existence of small niche investment banks in other parts of this market.) To the extent that this is the case, the test here provides for relevance of investment bank-differentiating factors over and above bank size. In this sense, the test here is a stricter test for relevance of bank-differentiating factors.
An important limitation of this model is that it cannot provide measures of direct effects of specific bank-differentiating factors. Indeed, (as can be seen in the section describing the model,) the differentiation index is invariant to particular compositional changes; that is, it is observationally equivalent to particular changes in the two parametric components of differentiation. Therefore, this work cannot address the role of specific bankdifferentiating factors.
The analysis here can (and does) inquire into the broader question of relevance of the hypothesized bank-provided industry-based differentiation, regardless of the form it may take, for firms choosing investment banks to float IPOs. Therefore, while this work cannot address the relevance of specific bank-differentiating factors such as the specific role of greater analyst coverage, or of star analysts, or of bank prestige, or of industry expertise, it can (and does) address the broader question of whether observed firm choices are consistent with the view that firms in an industry find value in some combination of a bundle of bank-differentiating factors. This broader test can serve a useful purpose, because different bank-differentiating factors can potentially interact with each other. For example, suppose firms in an industry treat a bank's industry expertise and a bank's prestige as close substitutes, (perhaps because each factor independently allows a firm's IPO to be placed on attractive terms,) and value these equally. In this case, if one bank provides industry expertise but not prestige, and another bank provides prestige but not industry expertise, then even though each bank is providing "differentiated" services, neither has significant market power, because products of both banks are close substitutes, and we would not expect to observe "high" prices based on market power. More generally, the test here allows for a combination of differentiating factors to influence firm profits and firm choice.
An appealing feature of EG's work is that the differentiation index is a "model-based" index, and it yields a testable prediction directly from the model. A secondary advantage of this model is that it side-steps some limitations of empirical measurement. For example, it may be hard to measure (and consequently, to separately identify the role of) the different bank-differentiating factors mentioned above. 7 Moreover, several factors mentioned above can influence the role of both underwriter prestige and industry expertise, and therefore, empirically, it may be hard to separate the specific contribution of a given factor on either parameter. These potential limitations are side-stepped here, because the analysis here represents only a combined effect of these two parameters.
The dataset used here is derived from SDC data for [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] , and it is bench-marked to updates to data in Chen and Ritter (2000) . Experiments are conduc ted at the level of fourdigit SIC codes (SIC4), three-digit SIC codes (SIC3), two-digit SIC Codes (SIC2), and some alternative sub-samples. Within these classifications, experiments are conducted for the overall period (1985-03), for three sub-periods used in Chen and Ritter (2000 ) -1985 -87, 1988 -94, 1995 Industries that exhibit differentiation appear to be diffused across the space of SIC codes, and include established industries, newer industries, and a mixture of the two. An aggregate measure of differentiation is declining over time, independent of SIC4, SIC3, or SIC2 classification. Therefore, one may conjecture that over time, on average, the moderate-sized IPO segment is moving toward less differentiation.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes an application of the Ellison-Glaeser model to this paper. Section 3 describes the data and presents the results. Section 4 concludes.
Model
The discrete-choice model of firm choice of investment bank used here is due to EG. 
. It is assumed, as in EG,
, where x i is bank i's share of all IPOs. 11 This serves two purposes.
First, notice that this model focuses on firm decision-making, and each firm is assumed to be small relative to a bank, and therefore, the modeling assumption is that a firm takes x i as exogenous ly given. This model does not explain a bank's decision-making process, and of course, a bank's decision-making affects a bank's market share. The condition above can be viewed in terms of closing the model, because it implies (using EG's description; confer the next footnote) that on average, the model reproduces the overall distribution of IPO activity. Thus, although bank decision-making is not explained in the model, the above condition can be viewed as an expected market clearing condition; it requires that expected firm choices are consistent with realized bank shares (that may depend on bank decisions not modeled).
12
11 Notice that the left-hand side of the equality is specific to an industry, but the right-hand side is the share of all IPOs under consideration, not just for a particular industry. 12 In EG, the variable x i is state i's share of all manufacturing employment, and it is assumed to be exogenous. Of course, in principle, a state can affect its share of manufacturing employment by providing incentives to attract certain industries; for example, attracting technology corridors in Virginia, or attracting car manufacturing in Alabama or Georgia. One may address this effect indirectly by postulating Second, if variance of probability of firm's choice of bank is zero, then firms choose banks independently, with probability x i , as if by throwing darts at a map of all banks with size of bank given by its market share. This formulates a benchmark.
For firms in this industry, the importance of underwriter prestige is incorporated in the model by assuming ( that although state decision-making is not explained in the model, the model is closed in the sense that on average, the model reproduces the overall distribution of manufacturing activity (words in italics from EG, page 893, explaining the above condition on expectation of relative profitability). However, it is a reasonable conjecture that a state can affect its own manufacturing activity less than a bank can affect its own market share, and in this sense, the exogeneity assumption is closer to reality in EG. 13 In EG, the analogous parameter is termed natural advantage, and it indexes importance of state characteristics for firms in an industry. 14 As mentioned above, firms in a particular industry might choose an investment bank partly because of its reputation, indicating the relevance of investment bank-specific factors, such as better bank placement of IPO shares depending on underwriter reputation, an overall reputation for better analysts or greater analyst coverage, a reputation for price stabilization activities or for liquidity, and so on. For firms in this industry, the importance of investment bank industry expertise (or industry experience, or industry knowledge) is captured by g in , and it depends on choices of other firms. To make the model tractable, these benefits are assumed (as in EG) to be of the following form. For every pair of firms, either there is a benefit to these firms from choosing the same bank, or not. For tractability, it is assumed that these benefits are either extremely important or not important at all. That is, for every pair of firms, if there are benefits from same choice, then firms optimally choose the same bank, (otherwise they have negative infinite profits,) and if there are no benefits from same choice, then choice of either firm has no effect on choice of the other firm. The probability that a pair of firms has such extreme benefits from same choice is denoted ]
. This parameter is termed industry expertise, 16 and it is interpreted as a combined (and reduced form) measure of relevance to this industry of factors related to an underwriter's industry expertise. 17 More formally, it is assumed that
where e kln is an indicator for existence of benefits from same choice, wit h probability of existence of such benefits given by 18 As noted in EG (page 895, footnote 4), for each n, the joint distribution of e kln is not fully specified here. As EG note, the computation of E(D n ) below is valid for all distributions satisfying the conditions here. As EG note, one such joint distribution is where the e knl are perfectly correlated; that is, with some probability γ 0 , all firms are completely interdependent, and with probability 1 -γ 0, all firm profits are independent. 19 This calculation measures firm size.
Under the null hypothesis
, and as shown in EG, Moreover, an index of the strength of bank-differentiating factors is
As shown in detail in EG, this index is an unbiased estimate of expe pres expe pres
is comparable across industries in which firms float IPOs of different sizes, it is comparable across different segments of the IPO market, and it is comparable across time.
Data and Analysis
To keep this analysis consistent with Chen and Ritter (2000) , the dataset used here is similar to the one they used, and is updated for more recent years. 20 The data consist of Additional data are provided in Table 1 .
In the moderate-sized IPO market, the mean bank market share is small, at about 0.006 (6/10 of a percent ), median is 0.001, and standard deviation is 0.013. However, consistent with existing information, the combined market share of the top 10 banks is about 50 percent, that of the top 25 banks is about 75 percent, and that of the top 50 banks is about 91 percent, and the remaining banks account for the remainder of the market share. 22 For moderate-sized IPOs, the correlation between bank market share and the average spread charged by the bank is low, at about -0.06.
22 Additional information about different aspects of the structure of banks is provided in Hansen (2001).
As described above, to investigate the explanation that Chen and Ritter's results for moderate-sized IPOs are consistent with explanations based on investment bankdifferentiating factors, the main hypothesis here is that for moderate-sized IPOs, bankdifferentiating factors are relevant for firms choosing banks to underwrite IPOs.
Additional analysis provides some information on industries for which differentiation exists. Results are as follows.
For moderate-sized IPOs, the evidence for existence of the hypothesized bank-provided industry-based differentiation is not widespread. -periods 1985-87, 1988-94, 1995-98, and 1999-03 , the comparable numbers are 12, 8, 10, and 4 percent, respectively. The numbers for these five experiments are shown Table   2 , panel I, titled 'BASE CASE (SIC4)', row 6.
The distribution of SIC4 industries over IPO counts has a fat tail at the low end, and a long, narrow tail at the high end; that is, there are many industries with a relatively small number of IPOs, and there are a few industries with a relatively large number of IPOs.
This can be seen in Figure 2 , panel I. (For ease of reference, the x-axis in these panels is truncated at 50. Full data for panels I and II are given in Tables 2.1-2.5, (as discussed below as well,) and for panels III and IV in Table A .1 in the appendix.) Test results for this experiment are reported in Table 2, Taken together, these experiments show that other than in a handful of the very largest industries, there does not appear to be widespread existence of differentiation, contrary to hypothesis.
To explore characteristics of industries in which differentiation exists, and the extent to which differentiation exists, three of the above sets of experiments are considered in more detail; these are the ones based on SIC4, SIC3, and SIC2 classifications. In each case, the focus is on the period 1985-03.
For each of these cases, Figure 3 'Business Services', which includes categories of computer and software, and also medical equipment rental and leasing, equipment rental and leasing, help supply services).
To provide a sense of the "average level" of differentiation that exists in a given time for industries in which differentiation exists. 27 This can be viewed as an aggregate measure of the level of differentiation that exists in a given time period. This measure is shown in Table 3 . Notably, for each of the three SIC classifications considered here, this measure is small and is decreasing over time. 28 Therefore, aggregate levels of differentiation do not appear to be increasing over time. This can be viewed as a slight extension of Chen and Ritter's puzzle; not only is price stability increasing over time, at least one measure of aggregate differentiation appears to be decreasing over time.
Intuitively, it can be conjectured that the moderate-sized IPO industry, as a whole, appears to be moving toward lower levels of differentiation.
Conclusion
This paper presents some results on the relevance of investment bank-differentiating factors in firm choices of investment banks to underwrite IPOs. These results show that for moderate-sized IPOs, there is a greater chance that differentiation exists in a few of the very largest industries, but bank-differentiating factors over and above bank size are not significantly relevant for firms in a large proportion of industries. Moreover, at least one aggregate measure of differentiation is declining over time.
Notably, the analysis here does not investigate implicit collusion as a possible explanation. Chen and Ritter's puzzle is consistent with that explanation as well, and there is a growing literature that addresses that question. 27 A similar measure cannot be constructed with great confidence at the industry level, because very few industries show existence of differentiation in all time periods. 28 Not much confidence can be placed in one of these numbers; the number for SIC4 in the period 1999-03 is based on two small industries, one of which has a negative index. Details are in Tables A.3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 Years Proportion of IPOs Below 7% At 7% Above 7% Table 2 . Existence of Differentiation 1985-03 1985-87 1988-94 1995-98 1999-03 I. BASE CASE (SIC4) 1985-03 1985-87 1988-94 1995-97 1998-00 2001-03 353  99  91  88  84  67  58  56  47  45  44  41  36  34  33  32  30  27  26  25  24  22  21  20  19  18  17  16  15  14  13  12  11  10  9  8  7  6  5  4  3 Freq .  65  35  28  18  17  14  13  12  11  10  9  8  7  6  5  4  3 Freq .  143  43  42  36  31  28  23  22  21  19  16  15  13  12  11  10  9  8  7  6  5  4  3 Freq .  132  55  32  31  27  26  16  15  14  12  11  10  8  7  6  5  4  3 
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